In this paper, we examine the incentives for central bank activism and caution in a two country open economy model with uncertainty and learning.
Introduction
The choice between an activist or cautious monetary policy remains a contentious issue between academics and central bankers. Academics such as Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) and Beck and Wieland (2002) argue that monetary policy should be activist to help the central bank in learning the key features of the economy. In contrast, central bankers such as Blinder (1998) and Issing (1999) believe that policy should predominantly be cautious due to uncertainty, following the result of Brainard (1967) . As Blinder (1998) puts it, "My intuition tells me that [Brainard's] …nding is more general -or at least more wise -in the real world than the [simple] mathematics would suggest".
In this paper, we attempt to reconcile these con ‡icting views by showing one way in which the call for caution made by Brainard (1967) is more general than it at …rst appears. We change the focus of the debate, from the closed economy models used in the existing academic arguments 1 , to open economy models with two countries. Our results suggest that optimal monetary policy may actually be even more cautious when learning is taken into account.
In an open economy model, learning by the home central bank cannot be considered in isolation since the foreign central bank is also learning at the same time. It is the balance of the costs and bene…ts of the joint learning of the home and foreign central banks that determines whether monetary policy 1 See, inter alia, Basar and Salmon (1990), Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) , Balvers and Cosimano (1994) , Wieland (1998 Wieland ( , 2000b and Beck and Wieland (2002) .
is activist or cautious. We show that the costs of joint learning dominate the bene…ts so there are no incentives for an activist policy -monetary policy should be cautious.
Our results derive from the strategic interaction between the home and foreign central banks that is central to the open economy model. Existing papers based on closed economy models do not take this strategic interaction into account and so do not fully capture the costs and bene…ts of an activist policy. 2 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe our two-country open economy model and discuss the roles of uncertainty and learning. The model is calibrated in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our results and show how optimal monetary policy becomes more cautious when learning is taken into account. We perform an extensive sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our result. The conclusions are presented in Section 5. 2 Similar issues have been explored in the game theory literature. The closed economy model is analogous to a monopolist adjusting its pricing policy to learn the demand conditions it faces (Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano (1993) ), whereas the open economy two country model is analogous to two duopolists learning about their common demand conditions (Aghion, Espinosa and Jullien (1993) ). The strategic interaction between the two …rms in the duopoly case leads to much richer dynamics in optimal pricing behaviour than in monopoly. (1) and (2) . Output in the home country, y t , is determined by the di¤erence between home in ‡ation, ¼ t , and in ‡ation in the foreign country,
Similarly, output in the foreign country, y ¤ t , depends on the level of foreign in ‡ation relative to in ‡ation in the home country. To maintain symmetry and maximise the degree of strategic interaction between the two countries, we assume that the Phillips curve parameter¯t is always the same in both countries. z t and z 
To introduce a role for learning in the model, we assume that the Phillips curve parameter¯t cannot be observed directly by either the home or foreign central bank. For simplicity of the learning process,¯t is restricted to be either high or low (¯H or¯L), with switches occurring according to a two-state Markov process. In other words, the economy switches between periods in which the Phillips curve parameter is high or low. The conditional probabilities of the parameter not switching, i.e. ½ H = P (¯t +1 =¯H j¯t =¯H) and Figure 1 : Timing of the model
The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1 . The observable output shocks are revealed to both the home and foreign central banks at the beginning of the period. The two central banks then set in ‡ation, the instrument of monetary policy. 4 Activism or caution is re ‡ected in the degree to which the central banks react to the observable output shocks. The …nal realisations of output are revealed at the end of the period. There is no asymmetric information in the model since each central bank always knows both observable output shocks.
Central bank loss function
The loss function of each central bank is assumed to be quadratic in the deviations of its own output and in ‡ation from target. We assume that the targets are set consistent with the natural rate of output so they can be normalised to zero and there is no in ‡ation bias. In the terminology of Svensson (1999) , each central bank has a ‡exible in ‡ation target. Equation 
The loss function of the foreign central bank is given analogously in terms of foreign output and in ‡ation by equation (4) . Both central banks care about in ‡ation and output with the same relative weight.
Allowing the central banks complete control over in ‡ation abstracts from uncertainty in the monetary transmission mechanism. Transmission uncertainty could be included in our model but would not change our main conclusions. (5) and (6) di¤er and how easy it is for the central bank to learn.
Beliefs

Learning
A simple application of Bayes rule solves the inference problem of the home central bank. Equation ( 
p + t is the optimal inference for the home central bank of the current value of the Phillips curve parameter, given the observed output shocks, in ‡ation choices and realised outputs. The home central bank is consequently able to make a prediction p t+1 of whether the parameter will be high in the next period, taking into account the possibility that the parameter may shift before then. In equation (8), the prediction is calculated as a weighted average of the probability of keeping a high value and the probability of switching back from a low to a high value.
Equations (7) and (8), when combined with the conditional distributions (5) and (6) for y t , de…ne a non-linear equation (9) for updating the beliefs of the home central bank. Updated beliefs are a function of current beliefs, observed output shocks, relative in ‡ation choices and the realised outputs.
B(¢) represents the Bayesian operator modi…ed to take into account Markovswitching e¤ects.
The symmetric nature of information in the model means that the beliefs of the foreign central bank, p ¤ t , are updated using exactly the same information and Bayesian formula (9) as the home central bank. In the model, there is always joint learning and the beliefs of the home and foreign central banks are updated simultaneously and identically. With such joint learning, dp t = dp ¤ t for all t.
Equilibrium
We assume that the home and foreign central banks play a non-cooperative Nash game, in which each central bank takes the actions of the other central bank as given. Both central banks therefore follow "beggar thy neighbour" policies. In equilibrium, each central bank chooses in ‡ation in its own country, taking in ‡ation in the other country as given.
Calibration
The model is calibrated to match monthly data, re ‡ecting the frequency with which monetary policy decisions are made. Table 1 The remaining four parameters in Table 1 cannot be estimated directly from the data. For the baseline calibration, we normalise the variancecovariance matrix of the observable output shocks, -, to be the identity matrix. This implies there are no common observable output shocks and the variance of idiosyncratic observable output shocks is the same in both countries. The variance-covariance matrix of the unobservable output shocks, §, is calibrated so that the ratio of unobservable to observable output shocks in each country is 0.3. In addition, there is no correlation between the unobservable home and foreign output shocks. Â re ‡ects the relative weight that each central bank places on in ‡ation and output deviations from target. It is calibrated for monthly data to give equal weight to in ‡ation and output deviations at the quarterly frequency. The choice of the discount factor, ±,
gives a quarterly discount rate of 1%.
Results
To analyse the incentives for activist or cautious monetary policy in the model, we derive the policy of the home central bank under two alternative assumptions about how learning issues are taken into account. With the passive learning policy, both central banks learn but neither consciously attempts to in ‡uence the speed of learning by adjusting the degree of activism or caution in policy. This policy forms our baseline case since, although each central bank is learning, neither takes into account that current actions affect learning. In contrast, under the active learning policy, the home central bank does internalise the consequences of its actions for learning. 5 From the viewpoint of the home central bank, we refer to this as the optimal policy. 6 
Passive learning policy
In the passive learning policy, each central bank optimally accounts for current uncertainty but fails to realise that current policy actions also a¤ect expected future losses. Learning is ignored. Since learning is the only source 5 In the active learning case, we assume that the foreign central bank continues to follow a passive learning policy. 6 The policy is optimal for the home central bank in the absence of a commitment technology by which the central banks can coordinate their actions.
of dynamics in the model, the problem of the home central bank reduces to that of minimising the expected one-period loss function each period, subject to foreign in ‡ation, the observable home output shock and the Phillips curve.
The loss minimisation problem of the home central bank is given in (10) .
By substituting the Phillips curve into the loss function, the problem can be written as equation (11). The expected one-period loss is a weighted average of the expected losses conditional on the true value of the Phillips curve parameter, with the weights being the beliefs of the home central bank.
Solving the …rst order condition for loss minimisation, the passive learning policy of the home central bank policy is given by equation (12) .
Equation (12) shows that, under the passive learning policy, home in‡ation reacts linearly to foreign in ‡ation and the observable home output shock. The extent to which the home central bank reacts depends on its beliefs, p t , and the distaste-for-in ‡ation parameter, Â. In general, the home central bank is more activist in responding if the distaste for in ‡ation is low.
An identical derivation de…nes the policy followed by the foreign central bank under passive learning. In equation (13) , foreign in ‡ation is a linear reaction to home in ‡ation and the observable foreign output shock. In this case, the size of the reaction depends on the beliefs of the foreign central bank, p
Equations (12) and (13) 
0.120
Welfare loss L 1.000 Table 2 : Stylised facts of the passive learning policy
The dynamic simulations show the symmetric nature of non-cooperative equilibrium in the model. In ‡ation and output are equally volatile in both the home and foreign countries. Since there is always joint learning in the model, we only report the variance of the beliefs of the home central bank.
The …nal row of Table 2 shows the average per-period welfare loss of the home central bank, calculated according to equation (3).
Active learning policy
The academic arguments of Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) and Beck and Wieland (2002) suggest that the passive learning policy is not optimal because it does not internalise the bene…ts of learning. They argue that central is much less than the variance of monthly output. Quarterly in ‡ation and output have approximately the same variance and so more comparable.
bank policy should be more activist in its response to the observed output shocks because this provides valuable information about the state of the economy. By increased activism, the central bank learns quicker about the economy and so can stabilise the economy better in the face of future observable output shocks.
To assess this argument in our open economy model, we calculate the active learning policy followed by the home central bank when it takes all the costs and bene…ts of learning into account, and then ask whether it is more activist or cautious than the passive learning policy. We assume throughout that the foreign central bank continues to follow a passive learning policy.
The active learning problem of the home central bank solves the dynamic loss-minimisation problem (14) , in which the home central bank minimises the net present value of expected losses, subject to four constraints. The …rst two constraints are the Phillips curve and the updating equation (9) The minimisation problem is intertemporal because future beliefs depend on current actions.
This problem has a recursive nature so the active learning policy must satisfy the Bellman equation (15) . the passive learning policy, the active learning policy involves less reaction to the observable home output shock. In other words, the home central bank's reaction to the observable home output shock is dampened. The active learning policy is more cautious than the passive learning policy. 
Sensitivity analysis
To establish the robustness of our result, we show that the active learning policy is more cautious than the passive learning policy for a wide range of calibrated parameter values. We do this by examining whether taking learning into account creates an incentive to decrease or increase activism relative to the passive learning policy. If the incentive is to decrease activism then the active learning policy will be more cautious than the passive learning policy.
The incentive to decrease or increase activism in turn depends on the convexity or concavity of the expected central bank loss function with respect to beliefs when the home and foreign central banks follow the passive learning policies. (16), in which the time subscripts on beliefs have been dropped for ease of notation.
Due to the symmetric nature of the model there is always joint learning of the home and foreign central banks, so dp t = dp ¤ t for all t. We therefore evaluate the convexity or concavity of the expected loss function by looking at the sign of the second derivative along the path of joint learning. Equation (17) shows that this second derivative has three components. The …rst, L pp , is the second partial derivative with respect to the beliefs of the home central bank. The second, L p ¤ p ¤ , is the second partial derivative with respect to the beliefs of the foreign central bank. The third, 2L pp ¤ , depends on the cross partial derivative with respect to the joint beliefs of both the home and foreign central banks.
The components of the second derivative of the expected loss function for the baseline model, evaluated at p t = p policy. This e¤ect dominates the e¤ects of learning in isolation so overall the active learning policy is cautious. The strategic interaction in our model is so strong that even though learning in isolation is bene…cial, the costs of joint learning are su¢ciently high that the active learning policy is more cautious than the passive learning policy.
p=dp ¤ Active learning policy 3 0.5 -0.37 -0.15 0.60 0.68 cautious Table 4 : Activism of monetary policy in the baseline calibration Table 5 reports whether the active learning policy is more activist or cautious than the passive learning policy under a wide range of alternative calibrations for the parameters¯H and¯L. In all cases, the value of L pp is positive and L pp ¤ is negative so learning of the home central bank in isolation is bene…cial but joint learning by both central banks is costly. The latter e¤ect dominates for all but one of the calibrations and so the active learning policy is typically more cautious than the passive learning policy. Only if¯H and¯L are small or of very similar magnitude is it possible for the active learning policy to be more activist than its passive learning counterpart.
Since these cases are of limited practical interest, we conclude that our result is robust to alternative calibrations. In an open economy with two countries playing a non-cooperative game, caution prevails. Monetary policy that internalises the costs and bene…ts of learning is actually even more cautious than if learning is ignored. Our result is robust to a wide range of calibrations.
Our conclusion di¤ers from the results of Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) and Beck and Wieland (2002) due to the presence of the foreign country in the open economy. There is a strategic interaction between the two central banks so the home central bank cannot consider its learning in isolationit has to recognise that the foreign central bank is also learning in tandem.
Joint learning of both central banks is costly in our model because they are e¤ectively learning to play a "beggar thy neighbour" non-cooperative Nash game, in which they both lose out. The cautious nature of the active learning policy is aimed at delaying the two central banks learning how to play this game.
A Numerical approximation of the active learning policy
The approximation to the active learning policy is obtained by solving the Bellman equation (15) numerically. This requires expressions for the expected one-period loss, E t L t , and the expected continuation value, E t V t+1 , for an in ‡ation choice ¼ t . The one-period loss is given by equation (3) and the expected continuation value is given by equation (A.1), where future beliefs p t+1 have been substituted out using the non-linear updating equation (9) .
The expectation in equation (A. 
) are the distributions of z t+1 and z ¤ t+1 . f (y t¯¼ ¤ t ;zt;pt;¼t ) and f(y To calculate the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium we use a simple iterative algorithm. In the …rst stage, the in ‡ation choices of the central bank are calculated for the given in ‡ation choices of the foreign central bank, using the procedure described above. In the next stage, the in ‡ation choices of the foreign central bank are updated according to the passive learning policy (13) . These foreign in ‡ation choices are then used as the basis for calculating the new in ‡ation choices of the home central bank. This procedure is iterated until convergence to non-cooperative equilibrium is achieved. Covergence is accepted when the change in the passive learning policy of the foreign central bank is less than 0.000001 for each gridpoint.
